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Abstract
This paper examines the distributional and eciency eects of pension pri-
vatization in Germany. Starting from a benchmark that reects the current
unfunded pension system, a fully funded system is introduced. The accrued
benets of the old system are nanced by alternative tax combinations as
well as decit increases. The quantitative analysis is based on an Auerbach-
Kotliko type simulation model that distinguishes between ve lifetime in-
come classes within each age cohort. The simulations reveal a clear trade-o
between the eciency and equity aspects of alternative nancing schemes.
While consumption taxes are the most ecient nancing instrument, they
also undermine intra- and intergenerational equity. Phasing-out the unfunded
system on the other hand not only dampens the income redistribution across
and within generations, but also reduces the eciency gains dramatically.
1. Introduction
The state of the current German pension system is highly alarming. The aging
society coupled with the prospect of increasing longevity is causing dramatic scal
strains to the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) nanced statutory pension scheme. In order to
keep the current benet level for future retirees, the contribution rate is projected
to increase up to 30 percent during the next decades. However, already the current
contribution level of 20 percent is considered to be too high. Therefore, the govern-
ment enacted the 1992 Pension Reform Act and just recently presented a draft for a
new Pension Reform Bill in order to restrain the expenditure growth. Both reforms
intend to lower the pension level gradually and to nance a higher proportion of
expenditures in the future by federal taxes. These measures, however, only improve
the nancial situation of the public pension system in the short and medium-run.
The long-run scal burdens inherent in the system either require a substantial in-
crease in the contribution rate or a dramatic reduction in the future benet level.
Since the necessary adjustments are almost unfeasible politically, the current un-
funded pension scheme is seen at the `verge of collapse' (Borsch-Supan, 1998) and
unsustainable for the future. It is, therefore, not surprising that in Germany, like
in many other countries, a growing number of economists are discussing the move
to a fully funded pension system
1
. In essence this means that public pensions will
be substituted by private retirement provisions in the future. This paper, therefore,
refers to the shift to a fully funded system as "privatization" of public pensions.
While population aging is dramatically reinforcing the need for a reform of the pen-
sion system, the case for privatization could be made even in an economy with a
stable demographic structure. The principle economic argument is based on the fact
that the rate of return in a funded system is higher than the implicit rate of return
in a PAYG system (Homburg, 1997). Consequently, a specic benet level can be
nanced with a much lower contribution rate in a funded system. This mainly has
two consequences. First, lower contribution rates imply a higher disposable income
and therefore a higher level of welfare for households living under a funded system.
Second, since contributions in a funded system yield the same return as savings,
they are no longer considered to be (at least partly) a form of taxation. Pension
1
Some recent contributions in this direction include Berthold and Schmid (1997), Frankfurter
Institut (1997), Glismann and Horn (1997), Hirte and Weber (1997) and Siebert (1998).
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privatization, therefore, eliminates the distortions of the labor-leisure decision un-
der the PAYG system. Since the contribution rate is added on top of the existing
marginal personal income tax rates the imposed deadweight loss is quite substantial.
As pointed out by Feldstein (1996), not only the labor supply (i.e. labor force par-
ticipation, number of working hours, occupational choice, etc.) is distorted, but also
the form in which compensation is taken (i.e. fringe benets or enhanced working
conditions).
While the long-run prospects of a fully funded pension system look very advanta-
geous, critics of such a switch point out the severe transitional problems. The more
the PAYGO system is intragenerationally fair, the lower are the eciency gains from
privatization, see Fenge (1995). The long run welfare gains are then mainly due to
redistribution, since working-age generations living at the time of the introduction
of the funded system have to bear a double burden. They will have to nance the
accumulated pension claims of the existing retirees and they will also have to provide
savings for their own retirement. The distribution of this burden within and across
generations depends on the chosen transitional arrangement. If privatization is, for
example, mainly nanced by progressive income taxes, then rich households bear a
higher burden relative to poor households. If it is nanced mainly by consumption
taxes, then households with high consumption shares and low saving rates will bear
a relatively higher burden. Finally, if the decit is increased, then part of the burden
is shifted to future generations. Of course, the nancing of the transition also aects
the above mentioned eciency gains from privatization. Since lump-sum taxes are
not available in practice, distortionary taxes have to be increased. The eciency
losses associated with these taxes have to be balanced against the eciency gains
due to the elimination of the unfunded system.
The present paper compares the distributional and eciency implications of alter-
native privatization scenarios for Germany. More specically, I analyze a phase-
out of the PAYG pension system where a fully funded system is gradually intro-
duced within 50 years. Such a privatization plan has been recently suggested by
the Frankfurter Institut (1997) for Germany and has been studied by Neumann
(1997) within a partial equilibrium framework. Alternatively, I also simulate an
immediate elimination of the PAYG system where the old claims are nanced by
general taxes. The latter approach was (at least in principle) pursued by Chile in the
eighties. The quantitative analysis is based on the overlapping generations model of
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the Auerbach-Kotliko (1987) type. In contrast to Raelhuschen (1993) and Hirte
and Weber (1997) who apply a similar framework, I do not intend to simulate a
Pareto-improving transition. Since the government in my model only compensates
the accumulated pension claims from the former PAYGO system, privatization will
always lead to welfare gains and losses for specic generations and households. In
addition, two important innovations distinguish the present study from the previous
ones. First, I disaggregate each generation into ve dierent lifetime income classes.
This allows the analyzation of intragenerational eects of alternative privatization
schemes
2
. Second, as in Fehr and Wiegard (1998), I disaggregate the welfare changes
into redistributional and eciency components. This will improve the interpretation
and the quantication of the dierent economic eects that are at work.
The simulations reveal a clear trade-o between the eciency and equity aspects of
alternative privatization schemes. While consumption taxes are the most ecient
nancing instrument, they also undermine intragenerational equity in the short run
and imply a dramatic redistribution towards future generations. A phased-out sub-
stitution towards a fully funded system dampens the intergenerational income re-
distribution and also comes at the cost of lower eciency gains. Eciency gains are
further dampened by policy preannouncement and decit policy, but are increased
if the interest rate is xed by the world market.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic structure of
the simulation model and explains its representation of the German public pension
system. Section 3 contains the simulation results. It rst explains the disaggregation
of equity and eciency eects for dierent households, then it discusses the specic
reform scenarios considered and reports the quantitative gures. Section 4 provides
some conclusions and directions for future research.
2. A simulation model of the German pension system
This section describes the simulation model which is used to evaluate alternative
privatization scenarios. The rst subsection sketches its general structure. Then
the second subsection explains the modeling of the German pension system in more
detail. Finally, the last subsection reports some important characteristics of the
benchmark equilibrium.
2
A similar disaggregation has been applied by Kotliko, Smetters and Walliser (1998) to simu-
late alternative privatization schemes for U.S. social security.
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2.1 The structure of the extended AK Model
The framework of the AK Model is by now a fairly standard tool in the numerical
analysis of public nance issues dealing with intergenerational redistribution. As-
suming rational expectations, the model calculates the transition path and the new
long-run equilibrium for an economy after a tax reform. It features 55 overlapping
generations with each adult living for 55 years, corresponding to the \natural" ages
of 20 to 75. In addition to the household sector, the domestic economy contains
rms and the government. In the open economy version, a foreign sector is added
to complete the model.
Each household decides how much to consume and how many hours to work in
each period, and when to withdraw from the workforce. For the latter decision,
it compares the reservation wage with the market wage. In the present model,
every generation is split into ve lifetime income quintiles. Wages for each lifetime
income class grow according to an exogenously specied age-wage prole which is
based on estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study. Hence,
in each period, the model distinguishes between 275 types of households according
to age and income. Preferences for current and future consumption and leisure
are governed by a time-separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
function with intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution of 0.25
and 0.7, respectively. The applied discount rate is 1.5 percent. Preferences are
identical for all lifetime income classes. This reects the belief that poor households
would behave like rich ones, provided they had the same (higher) income. Agents are
only concernd with their own welfare, i.e. there is no bequest motive. This might
appear to be quite restrictive on rst sight. However, as will become clear in a
later section, the present model is also able to represent an extreme altruism model,
where all intra- and intergenerational redistribution eects are eliminated through
countervailing transfers. The growth rate of the economy is set at 2.5 percent per
year which includes the growth of the labor force and technological progress.
The producer side of the economy is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale CES
production function using labor and capital as inputs. The elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is 0.9, and the resulting capital-income share is 30 percent
in the benchmark equilibrium. The capital stock depreciates at 7 percent annually.
Investment decisions follow the Q-theory of investment, according to which rms
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will invest whenever the stock market value of their assets exceeds the cost of re-
placement. This is consistent with investment behavior derived from maximizing
the market value of the rm when capital formation is subject to convex installation
costs. Note, however, that there are no installation costs in the steady state.
The government sector supplies a given amount of public goods, which enter the
individual utility function in an additively separable manner. A second item on the
expenditure side of the public budget are transfers to the pension system. Govern-
ment outlays are nanced by issuing new debt and collecting taxes from individuals
and rms. The model represents consumption taxes and corporate taxes as well as
progressive taxes on labor, capital income and pensions. The consumption tax rate
is 15 percent which represents an aggregate of value-added and various excise taxes.
The statutory corporate tax rate in the model is set at 56 percent reecting the
corporate tax on retained earnings as well as the trade tax on capital income. In
order to obtain a realistic corporate tax revenue, the tax base is reduced by invest-
ment expensing and accelerated depreciation allowances. The eective corporate
tax rate in the benchmark equilibrium, therefore, amounts to 32 percent. Labor
income is subject to a progressive wage tax. The respective marginal tax rates and
income brackets follow the tax rate schedule of 1996 and, therefore, vary between
zero and 53 percent. Taxable income is derived after deducting a uniform allowance
of DM 20,000. Forty percent of pensions income is also taxed according to the same
progressive tax rate shedule. Due to the high basic allowance, only pensioners of
the top income class pay income taxes. Capital income is also taxed progressively.
In contrast to labor income, the allowance depends on the income level and varies
between DM 7000 and DM 40,000. This should reect the fact that, in Germany,
only wealthy people can take full advantage of various tax arbitrage opportunities.
2.2 The modeling of the German pension system
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In 1996, total expenditures of the statutory pension scheme (GRV) amounted to DM
350 billion or about 10 percent of GDP. Except for civil servants, whose pensions
are paid directly from the budget, all dependent employees are compulsorily in-
sured. Most self-employed are exempted from compulsory insurance. However, they
may join the system as voluntary members. Apart from a liquidity reserve which
3
For a comprehensive description of the current German pension system see Borsch-Supan and
Schnabel (1997).
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amounts to one month's expenditure, the system currently has no funding. In 1996,
the contribution rate was 19.2 percent, which was applicable up to a monthly con-
tribution ceiling of DM 8000 or about 1.8 times the average gross earnings of all
insured persons. Consequently, if the employee earned less than DM 8000, 9.6 per-
cent is deducted from his gross wage and another 9.6 percent is paid directly by the
employer into the public pension system. In addition to these private contributions,
the federal government provides a grant which is meant to cover benets which are
not directly related to old age insurance. These include credits for military service
or child-rearing and the cost of rehabilitation benets and health insurance for pen-
sioners. Normal retirement with full benets is possible in Germany after age 63
after a contribution record of at least 35 years. However, the average retirement
age is much lower due to the generous early retirement options. In 1996, the overall
average retirement age was 60. In the case of early retirement before age 65, a strict
earnings test has to be passed when working in addition to receiving an old age
pension. Since pensions are reduced quite dramatically if earnings exceed certain
limits, partial retirement is extremly rare in Germany.
Pension benets are computed by multiplying the number of "earning points" (EP)
and the "actual pension amount" (APA). Additionally, there are two adjustment
factors concerning the retirement age and the type of pension
4
. For each year
of service, the worker receives an earning point which reects his relative income
position in that year. If he receives the average wage, then he gets exactly one
earning point. If he receives more or less than average earnings he receives points
on a pro-rata basis (i.e. 0.8 points if he earns 80 percent of the average, etc.). Due
to the contribution ceiling, there is an upper limit of roughly 1.8 points per year of
service. Various credits are given for non-contributory periods such as child-rearing
and military service. If the insured worker has contributed for 35 years, earning
points below 0.75 are raised by 50 percent to a maximum of 0.75. This increase
predominantly benets female pensioners who made very low contributions during
their working years. When the worker retires, the sum of his earning points is
multiplied by the APA, i.e. the (monthly) payment in a given year for one EP.
4
The pension access factor { introduced in 1992 { is 1.0 for regular retirement and lower or
higher for early or late retirement. The factor of pension type is 1.0 in the case of old age and
invalidity pension, 0.66 in the case of vocational disability pension and 0.6 in the case of a widow's
pension.
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The APA is adjusted annually according to the growth of net wages. Currently, the
so-called standard pension which is received after a 45-year contribution history by
a worker who always earned the average wage amounts to 70 percent of average net
earnings.
In the model, I assume that all individuals retire after 40 working years at age 61.
Pension benets which they receive in year s, b
s
, are computed from the sum of
the earning points EP
j
which the retiree has received during his past working life,
multiplied by the actual pension amount of the respective year:
b
s
=
40
X
j=1
EP
j
APA
s
: (1)
The earning point received in working year j for his annual gross labor income y
j
is
calculated according to the formula
EP
j
=
8
<
:
min(1:5y
j
=y
j
; 0:75) if y
j
 0:75y
j
y
j
=y
j
if 0:75y
j
< y
j
< 1:8y
j
:
1:8 if 1:8y
j
 y
j
This formulation reects some of the redistributional features of the German pension
system mentioned above. If the individual income in year j, is below 75 percent of
average income y
j
, then the accounted earning point is increased up to 50 percent.
If the annual individual income is above the contribution ceiling, which exceeds
the average income by 80 percent, then a maximum earning point of 1.8 is credited.
Below the contribution ceiling and above the minimum threshold, earning points are
computed from the ratio of individual income to the average income of the respective
year. The actual pension amount in the second part of equation (1) is set by the
government. As in reality, this number reects the payments for one earning point.
In the model, APA
s
is computed so that the standard pension (i.e. where the sum
of earnings points is 40) amounts to 70 percent of net average earnings, y
n
s 1
, of
the previous year
5
, i.e.
APA
s
= 0:7
1
40
y
n
s 1
:
The budget of the pension system must be balanced in each period. Therefore,
the aggregate contribution rate, 
p
s
, has to be adjusted to fulll the period budget
5
Since the model does not take into account credits from non-contributory periods, a standard
pension after 40 contribution years is quite realistic.
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constraint

p
s
PY
s
= (1   #
s
)PB
s
; (2)
where PY
s
denes the aggregate compulsory earnings base and PB
s
is the aggregate
pension outlays in period s. The share of expenditures nanced by the government
is denoted by #
s
. As discussed above, the government grant to the pension system
mainly covers non-contribution related benets. Since I cannot represent such ben-
ets satisfactorily in the model
6
, I assume that in the benchmark equilibrium the
government grant is zero, i.e. # = 0. In principle, households still could chose to
work after receiving pension payments. However, I assume that individuals face a
marginal labor income tax of 60 percent if they work after passing the retirement
age. This assumption is designed to capture the above mentioned earnings test
applied to early retirement.
Due to the contribution ceiling, individual contribution rates might dier from the
aggregate one. Workers who receive an annual income above the contribution ceiling,
face a zero marginal contribution rate and a declining average contribution rate.
2.3 The benchmark equilibrium
Given the endowments and the parameters describing preferences, technologies and
the scal system, the model can be solved for the initial steady state. Ideally, this
benchmark equilibrium should reect some stylized facts of the German economy.
An important innovative feature of the present model is that it exactly reproduces
the step function of the marginal tax rate schedule for the labor income tax. Most
simulation models are not able to handle such kinks in the budget constraint, where
the marginal tax rate changes abruptly in response to small changes in the agent's
behavior. The present model bridges this discontinuity of the budget constraint by
solving for so-called "virtual" marginal tax rates which place the optimizing agent
exactly at the kink if they wish to be there. Individuals of the lowest income quintile
start with DM 23,000 annual labor income and then receive for most of their time up
until retirement exactly DM 32,000. Since they can deduct DM 20,000 as allowances
and the rst DM 12,000 of taxable income are not taxed in Germany, they pay no
labor income tax at all during their lives. In the third quintile, annual labor income
6
These include credits for military service or child-rearing as well as the cost of rehabilitation
benets and health care insurance for pensioners.
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starts at DM 32,000 and then increases up to DM 45,000 when they are 45, after
which it then decreases again to DM 32,000 when they retire. In the top income
quintile, labor income starts at DM 58,000. It increases up to almost DM 120,000
when they are 43, and then it decreases again to DM 70,000. Note that these
gures include neither annual capital income nor pension benets. If both are taken
into account, then the income distribution of the benchmark matches the German
situation quite well, as the rst part of Table 1 demonstrates. The right column
reports the quintile shares from a study which used net-of-tax income data of West
German individuals in 1992 from the SOEP. The respective distributional gures
from the benchmark equilibrium are reported in the second column of Table 1.
Table 1: The benchmark equilibrium
Model Germany
benchmark 1992
a
, 1996
b
Qunitile shares of annual net income in percent
Lowest 9.3 9.5
Second 13.7 14.0
Third 17.4 17.8
Fourth 21.6 22.8
Top 38.0 35.9
General government indicators (Percent of GDP)
Aggregate pension benets 7.2 10.0
Government consumption 18.4 19.6
Gross debt 60.0 60.7
Interest paid 5.4 3.7
Tax revenues 24.2 23.2
Labor income tax 9.9 7.3
Capital yields tax 1.1 1.2
c
Corporate income tax 1.4 1.6
d
Tax on goods and services 10.2 9.3
e
Interest rate (in percent) 9.0 {
Saving rate
f
7.9 12.8
Source:
a
Mueller et al. (1994, 49).
b
Deutsche Bundesbank (1997).
c
Withholding taxes on interest and capital yields plus corporate tax on distributed prots.
d
Trade tax on capital income plus corporate tax on retained earnings.
e
Turnover tax and excise tax.
f
Change in assets as a percentage of disposable income.
The second part of Table 1 reports the structure of the government in the benchmark
equilibrium and the corresponding actual gures for 1996. Due to the constant
population growth rate, the number of pensioners relative to the number of workers
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is quite low in the model. Consequently, aggregate pension benets are below the
actual level. Most of the workers are facing an average and marginal contribution
rate of 10.5 percent in the benchmark. However, some high income earners who
exceed the income ceiling face a marginal contribution rate of zero and a lower
average contribution rate. The aggregate average contribution rate, therefore, is 10.1
percent, which is roughly half of the contribution rate in 1996, and the aggregate
marginal contribution rate is 8.2 percent. Note that these marginal contribution
rates reect the distortions created by the current PAYG system quite well. The
fraction of contributions which is considered to be an implicit tax is determined
by the remaining periods until retirement and the dierence in the return workers
receive on the capital market and the implicit return of the PAYG system. If the
interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the work force, then contributions made
early in life are more distortive than contributions made just before retirement.
Some back of the envelope calculations by Homburg and Richter (1990) indicate
an average implicit tax rate of 9 percent. Hirte and Weber (1997), on the other
hand, explicitly take into account the timing of the contributions. Consequently,
their marginal contribution rate is close to the statutory contribution rate for young
households and approaches zero percent for older households which are close to
retirement.
Government consumption outlays are slightly below the actual gure for 1996. The
debt level in the benchmark equilibrium amounts to 60 percent of GDP, which
is a realistic gure for 1996. However, due to the high interest rate, the interest
payments are above the actual gures and due to the low growth rate, the decit-
output level is only 1.5 percent. Aggregate tax revenues in the model, on the other
hand, approximate the actual gure quite well. Note, however, that the labor income
tax in the model also has to cover revenues from other taxes which are not explicitly
taken into account. Overall, the government sector is underrepresented in the model,
since aggregate government outlays sum up to almost 50 percent of GDP in Germany.
Of course, this is mainly due to the fact that I do not take into account transfers
due to social assistance programs and other state-organized insurance schemes for
health, unemployment, accident and nursing care. In a model without uncertainty
it is almost impossible to model such transfers satisfactorily. At the same time these
programms do not seem to have an important eect on the welfare consequences of
pension privatization.
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Finally, note that I model a closed economy in the initial steady state. Consequently,
the interest rate is determined endogenously by private savings. However, private
savings are low, mainly because of the pension system. Furthermore, the public
decit crowds out part of the capital stock and, consequently, the interest rate is
quite high in the benchmark equilibrium
7
.
3. Simulation and policy analysis
This section contains the simulation exercises. Before I present the numerical results,
I rst have to explain the welfare decomposition used in this study.
4.1 The decomposition of welfare changes
In order to evaluate the pension privatization experiment, I compute the changes in
economic welfare or utility (U) for the dierent generations and households. These
welfare changes must be due to either (re)distributional eects or to eciency ef-
fects. Distributional eects alone arise for two dierent reasons. On the one hand,
the elimination of the PAYG system changes the net tax burdens (T ). After the
reform, each household faces a dierent tax payment and receives a dierent pension
benet than under the old system. On the other hand, pension privatization may
also aect gross-of-tax prices, especially in the closed economy. If, for example, the
marginal product of labor increases after the privatization while the marginal prod-
uct of capital falls, then workers will gain at the expense of those who consume their
savings. In the following, P denotes that part of the total welfare change which
is due to changes in gross-of-tax factor prices. Turning to the ecency component
of welfare changes, behavioral reactions come to the fore. In order to avoid taxes,
households or rms will substitute away from the more heavily taxed activities. The
change in economic welfare which is exclusively due to tax avoidance activities is
denoted in the following with TA. As Fehr and Kotliko (1996) or Fehr and Wie-
gard (1998) show, the total individual welfare change following a policy reform can
be decomposed into the three components:
U =  T +P +TA:
The rst term on the right-hand-side (RHS) captures welfare changes due to changes
in the present value of net tax burdens. The negative sign indicates that an increase
7
However, Feldstein (1996, 9) indicates that this gure is close to the average U.S. pretax rate
of return over the past 35 years.
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in the present value of tax payments will decrease welfare. The second term, P ,
records welfare changes that are due to changes in the present value of factor incomes.
The sum of the two terms measures the redistributional eect of the tax reform for a
specic household. Finally, TA quanties changes in the present value of individual
tax payments that are due to tax avoidance reactions. Note that tax avoidance
eorts refer to behavioral reactions, including income as well as substitution eects.
However, eciency eects or changes in excess burdens are related to substitution
eects only. In order to isolate the eciency eects of policy reforms, one has
to eliminate the income eects by compensating households for any distributional
gains or losses. In the present context, the redistributional content of the policy (i.e.
 T +P ) has to be neutralized by countervailing transfers. After compensation,
the rst two terms on the RHS of the above equation are zero, and the last term is
converted into the pure eciency eect or the present value of the changes in excess
burdens (EB).
In the following section, I numerically calculate the welfare changes (U) for dif-
ferent households and generations and decompose it into its redistributional com-
ponents ( T;P ) and its eciency part (EB). Note, however, that eciency
and redistribution terms do not add up exactly to total welfare changes. This, of
course, is due to the fact that in general EB 6= TA.
I close this section with a nal remark regarding the no bequest assumption of the
preference structure. As explained above, I isolate the eciency eects of a specic
privatization scenario by neutralizing all intra- and intergenerational income eects.
Such a situation can be interpreted as a Barro-Ricardo world, where all generations
and households are linked by an operative altruistic bequest motive. This explains
the above remark that the present model incorporates bequests in an indirect way.
4.2 Some numerical results
The simulations start from the initial steady state of year 0 as described above. In
the AK Model, privatization of the pension system is quite simple. It just requires
that the workers receive no more earning points (i.e. EP
s
= 0) after a specic year.
Since the model features a perfect capital market, forcing individuals to private pen-
sions accounts would make no dierence, since it only crowds out voluntary private
savings. Hence, there is no need for a private pension system in the model. I also
assume that the restrictions for working after retirement are loosened as well. Those
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generations who are not retired in the initial year of the privatization can now work
without the earnings test until age 64 although they still receive pensions from the
old system starting at age 61. Therefore, the privatization experiment in the model
mainly involves the decision on how to nance the accrued pension benets from the
old system. In this respect, I rst consider a scenario with an immediate elimination
of the PAYG system where the pensions of the elderly are nanced by consump-
tion taxes. While the consumption tax rate is adjusted to balance the budget, the
government outlays now also include the accrued pension claims (i.e. #
s
= 1). Of
course, such a policy reform is not very realistic. Therefore, I contrast it in the
second simulation with the more realistic case where the PAYG system is phased-
out, and the pensions of the elderly are nanced by contributions of the working
generations (i.e. #
s
= 0). Again, the consumption tax is adjusted to balance the
budget of the government. The remaining experiments are intended to test the sen-
sitivity of the results of the phase-out scenario with respect to specic assumptions.
I rst introduce a preannouncement period of ve years, then I consider a partial
decit nancing scenario, and nally I repeat the phase-out policy in a small open
economy. When privatization is partially decit nanced I assume that the decit is
increased from 1.5 percent of GDP to 3 percent of GDP which nances 20 percent
of the pension claims (i.e. #
s
= 0:2).
4.2.1 Macroeconomic response
Let us now turn to the numerical results. Table 2 shows the macroeconomic adjust-
ment for the ve privatization scenarios described above. The table presents the
changes in employment, capital stock, GDP, asset prices, wages, interest rate, the
consumption tax rate, and the contribution rate at four points during the transition:
in year 1 when the privatization starts, in year 5 and year 15 after the privatization,
and in the long-run
8
. Note that the changes in the interest rate, the consumption
tax rate and in the contribution rate are in percentage points, not in percentage of
initial values.
Let us rst compare the two base case scenarios. Of course, since privatization is
nanced by currently living domestic generations alone, both simulations feature
8
The capital stock and the interest rate are xed in the inital year of the transition. Therefore,
they are reported for year 2 instead. Since the contribution rate is always reduced to zero in the
long-run equilibrium, it is reported for year 30 instead.
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Table 2: Macroeconomic eects of privatization
a
base case sensitivity of phase-out
immed. phase- time debt smopec
Variable elimin. out lag policy
Employment
Year 1 1.6 0.3 -0.4 1.2 0.0
Year 5 2.8 1.9 -0.3 2.5 2.1
Year 15 3.6 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.4
Year innity 5.6 5.6 5.6 4.2 1.2
Capital stock
Year 2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2
Year 5 2.0 0.2 -0.6 0.0 0.9
Year 15 7.8 2.9 1.2 1.3 2.6
Year innity 29.9 29.9 29.9 13.8 1.2
GDP
Year 1 1.1 0.2 -0.2 0.8 0.0
Year 5 2.6 1.4 -0.4 1.7 1.8
Year 15 4.8 2.9 2.1 2.5 3.2
Year innity 11.9 11.9 11.9 6.8 1.2
Asset price
Year 1 2.0 -0.4 -0.8 -0.5 1.3
Year 5 3.4 1.1 -0.9 0.6 1.4
Year 15 3.1 1.9 1.7 1.1 0.9
Year innity -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 0.0
Wage
Year 1 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0
Year 5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3
Year 15 1.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2
Year innity 6.7 6.7 6.7 2.8 0.0
Interest rate
Year 2 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.0
Year 5 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0
Year 15 -0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
Year innity -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -0.9 0.0
Consumption tax
Year 1 9.7 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.3
Year 5 10.0 -0.3 0.6 0.2 -0.5
Year 15 6.7 -1.5 -0.8 0.6 -1.2
Year innity -7.5 -7.5 -7.5 -0.2 -4.5
Contribution rate
Year 1 -10.1 0.0 0.0 -2.1 0.0
Year 5 -10.1 -0.4 0.0 -2.1 -0.4
Year 15 -10.1 -1.9 -1.0 -3.4 -1.9
Year 30 -10.1 -5.6 -4.3 -6.5 -5.6
a
All changes reported are percentage increases over baseline steady state,
except for changes in interest, consumption tax and contribution rates,
which are already expressed as changes in percentage points.
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the same long-run equilibrium. If the accrued benets have to be nanced by con-
sumption taxes, then the tax rate has to increase by 9.7 percent on impact. But
at the same time the pension contribution rate is eliminated so that labor supply
and savings increase on impact. Consequently, wages fall on the labor market to
absorb the higher labor supply. Firms will increase employment by 1.6 percent in
the initial year which in turn improves the marginal product of capital and drives
up the asset prices by 2.0 percent. On the capital market, the higher investment
demand induces a higher interest rate despite the higher savings. On impact, the
capital stock only rises by 0.3 percent. During the transition, new generations enter
the labor force making labor supply and savings increase further. While the rising
employment further increases asset prices and investment demand, the rising savings
dampen the increase in the interest rate on the capital market. The capital stock
and GDP, therefore, rise strongly during the whole transition. The higher capital
stock in turn improves the marginal product of labor. Consequently, labor demand
and employment increase, while wages rise. In contrast, the marginal product of
capital decreases and, consequently, asset prices will fall again. After the initial
increase, the consumption tax rate can be reduced because the burden from the old
pension system falls, and the revenue from the labor income tax increases steadily.
In the long-run equilibrium, the capital stock has increased by 29.9 percent, wages
are 6.7 percent higher and the consumption tax rate has fallen from 15 percent down
to 7.5 percent.
Consider now the adjustment in the second experiment where the accrued pension
benets are still nanced by contributions. On impact, the consumption tax rate
as well as the contribution rate only vary slightly. Consequently, labor supply and
savings increase much less than before and wages only have to fall slightly to balance
the labor market. On impact, employment now increases only by 0.3 percent. Since
asset prices increase much less than before, the high contribution rate also dampens
the capital accumulation during the initial periods quite signicantly.
Next, the phase-out experiment is repeated with a time lag of ve years. Since
households know that the contribution rate will fall after year 5, they reduce their
labor supply during the preimplementation phase. Consequently, asset prices, in-
vestment demand and the capital stock also fall before the implementation of the
pension reform. As labor income tax revenues fall, the consumption tax rate has to
increase. After the implementation of the new pension system in year 6, all vari-
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ables jump on a new path in order to reach the same long-run equilibrium as in the
previous experiment.
While alternative tax nancing schemes and policy preannouncement only have tran-
sitional eects, partial decit nancing will also change the long-run equilibrium.
As shown in the fourth column, an increase in the decit-GDP ratio by 1.5 per-
cent allows to reduce the contribution rate signicantly on impact. Therefore, labor
supply and employment increase much more strongly than in the base case experi-
ment. But a higher decit also crowds out investment on the capital market. As a
result, the capital stock even falls slightly on impact and the capital accumulation
during the transition is much slower. In the long-run, the capital stock increases
now by 13.8 percent. In the long-run equilibrium, the increased decit-output ratio
results in higher interest payments. At the same time, the long-run labor income
tax revenue falls compared to the previous experiments. Consequently, the long run
consumption tax rate now falls only slightly by 0.2 percent.
The last column of Table 2 reports the results if the phase-out experiment is run
in a small open economy. In the short-run, the capital accumulation is now faster
due to capital inows from abroad. The changes in labor supply can be explained
by two dierent price reactions. On the one side, the xed interest rate eliminates
the negative short-run human capital eect of the closed economy experiment. This
might explain the dampened initial increase in employment. At the same time, the
strong initial increase in asset prices implies a negative income eect for middle aged
generations, which might explain the stronger increase in labor supply during the
early transition compared to the closed economy. However, during the transition,
capital accumulation is dampened, since the interest rate cannot fall as in the closed
economy experiment. The lower capital accumulation decreases the labor demand
of rms and, consequently, employment rises less than in the previous experiment.
Wages can vary only temporarily during the transition. In the long-run equilibrium,
employment increases in accordance with the capital stock so that wages will return
to their initial level
9
. Due to the higher long-run interest rate, the debt service is
now higher than in the closed economy experiment. In addition, labor income tax
revenues are lower than before. Consequently, the long-run consumption tax rate is
higher than in the closed economy.
9
In a model without adjustment costs, wages would also be xed during the transition.
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Table 3: Aggregate equity and eciency eects of pension privatization
base case sensitivity of phase-out
immed. phase- time debt smopec
elimin. out lag policy
Annual aggregate eciency gain
in % of
tax revenue 6.87 4.74 3.21 4.64 5.70
in bill. DM 54.96 37.92 25.68 37.12 45.60
Annual Gini-coecient
a
(Base year: 0.270)
Year 1 0.261 0.273 0.267 0.269 0.274
Year 10 0.279 0.287 0.286 0.285 0.285
Year 20 0.276 0.284 0.285 0.282 0.284
Year innity 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.296 0.295
a
Based on annual disposable income.
4.2.2 Welfare, eciency and equity
More interesting than the macroeconomic consequences are of course the welfare
implications of pension privatization for dierent households and generations. Are
there any eciency gains from pension privatization? What are the distributional
implications of the dierent reform scenarios I consider in this study? Before I
discuss the details of the simulation results, the eciency and distributional conse-
quences of the policy reforms are presented with some aggregate indices in Table
3.
In the upper part of Table 3, I report the annual eciency gains in percent of the
tax revenue from the initial equilibrium and in billion DM. As shown, the model
predicts an annual eciency gain between 25 and 55 billion DM for a privatized
pension system. Of course, these numbers have to be interpreted carefully, since
they depend on the chosen parametrization. Nevertheless, these numbers are in the
range of the back-of-the-envelope calculations by Homburg and Richter (1990) who
estimate an annual eciency gain of 36 billion DM from privatization of the German
pension system.
The lower part of Table 3 summarizes the distributional implications by reporting
the Gini-coecients of annual net income for specic years during the transition and
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for the nal steady state. The relevant Gini-coecient in the benchmark was 0.270.
Therefore, pension privatization will increase annual income inequality in the long
run. However, the interpretation of the Gini-coecients is especially problematic,
since they are based on annual net income. A systematic evaluation of the welfare
consequences of pension reform, however, has to be based on lifetime income. This
will be done in the following.
Table 4 and Table 5 report the associated welfare changes of these experiments
for dierent income quintiles of representative generations. The head column in
both tables lists the dierent income quintiles and representative generations for
which the welfare eects are reported. I have selected only the lowest, the middle
and the top income quintile. In addition, I also report the aggregate eect for the
entire generation. The numbers in the head column refer to the birth year of a
household or generation. The policy reform starts at the beginning of period 1
(which is identical with the end of period 0). The number "0", therefore, refers to
the generation born at the end of period 0 which starts working 20 years after the tax
reform. Similarily, the number "-20" refers to the generation which starts working
in the reform period while the number "-70" means that this generation is 70 years
old at the time of the reform and has 5 years to live. Finally, "Innity" denotes
the generations born after the new steady state equilibrium has been reached. The
following columns report the individual welfare changes (U) and its decomposition
into distributional (T;P ) and eciency (EB) components. All welfare changes
are expressed as percentages of the remaining lifetime resources of the respective
generation in the benchmark equilibrium. This is the standard practice in dynamic
simulation models
10
. Similarily, whenever I refer to aggregate eects across income
classes and/or generations, the present value of remaining lifetime resources over
the respective household group is used as the reference magnitude.
The results of the consumption tax experiment are reported in the left part of Table
4. Assume for a moment that the model does not distinguish between dierent
lifetime income classes. In this case one would report the aggregate, generation-
specic welfare measures in the lower part of Table 3. Not surprisingly, privatization
increases the welfare of currently young and future generations at the expense of
generations older than 30 years of age. The long-run welfare increase amounts to
10
For a discussion, see Fullerton and Rogers (1993, 22f.).
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Table 4: Welfare eects of pension privatization: base case
a
Immediate PAYG elimination Phase-out of PAYG pensions
Birth year U  T P EB U  T P EB
Lowest Quintile
-70 -1.42 -1.62 0.50 -0.03 0.09 -0.06 0.15 -0.01
-50 -1.75 -2.36 -0.02 0.81 -0.98 -1.77 0.13 0.66
-30 -0.42 -0.50 -0.38 0.29 -0.75 -0.85 -0.15 0.29
-20 0.74 0.61 -0.35 0.26 -0.20 -0.15 -0.27 0.19
0 4.22 3.17 0.25 0.37 3.00 2.59 -0.14 0.28
Innity 7.78 5.58 1.33 0.42 7.78 5.58 1.33 0.42
Third Quintile
-70 -1.53 -1.78 0.53 -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.15 0.00
-50 -1.06 -2.20 -0.01 1.08 -0.11 -1.06 0.14 0.58
-30 0.11 -0.68 -0.40 0.73 -0.28 -0.57 -0.16 0.12
-20 1.05 0.34 -0.35 0.64 0.13 -0.07 -0.26 0.20
0 3.81 2.32 0.21 0.93 1.21 2.02 -0.16 0.66
Innity 6.61 4.20 1.23 1.10 6.61 4.20 1.23 1.10
Top Quintile
-70 -1.36 -1.56 0.44 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.00
-50 -1.17 -1.72 -0.03 0.43 -0.14 -0.95 0.11 0.55
-30 0.33 0.78 -0.34 -0.19 -0.27 -0.66 -0.18 0.33
-20 1.36 1.21 -0.25 0.64 0.12 0.04 -0.24 0.28
0 3.79 3.02 0.58 0.96 2.66 2.47 0.06 0.72
Innity 6.10 4.38 1.95 1.25 6.10 4.38 1.95 1.25
Aggregate
-70 -1.45 -1.66 0.48 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.14 0.00
-50 -1.20 -2.03 -0.02 0.81 -0.26 -1.10 0.13 0.58
-30 0.13 -0.18 -0.38 0.39 -0.35 -0.67 -0.16 0.23
-20 1.15 0.70 -0.32 0.62 0.07 -0.06 -0.26 0.24
0 3.66 2.35 0.35 0.89 2.64 2.06 -0.08 0.64
Innity 6.35 4.01 1.52 1.09 6.35 4.01 1.52 1.09
a
Changes expressed as percent of the present value of remaining lifetime resources.
more than 6 percent of initial lifetime resources. Most of the welfare eects are
explained by changes in net tax burdens which are computed in the third column.
This simply reects the fact that the consumption tax rate increases for generations
living in the reform year, but decreases again even below its initial level in the
long-run. The fourth column reports the income eect which is due to changes in
pre-tax prices. The elderly gain is due to the initial increase in asset prices, while
some middle-aged generations will lose a little bit since they have to buy the more
expensive capital stock and due to the temporary fall in wages. Generations living
in the new steady state experience quite a signicant income increase due to the
long-run rise in wages.
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Next, I neutralize these intergenerational income eects in order to compute the
changes in excess burdens. There are two countervailing eects on economic ef-
ciency in the short and medium-run. On the one hand, the elimination of the
contribution rate and the removal of the earnings test will enhance economic e-
cency. On the other hand, the increase of the consumption tax rate will reinforce the
distortions of the consumption-leisure choice. Although initially the consumption
tax rate increases almost by the same amount as the contribution rate is reduced,
there is good reason to expect that the eciency losses from the consumption tax
increase are dominated by the ecency gains from the contribution rate elimination.
Since the pension contribution rate is imposed on top of the progressive labor income
tax, the deadweight loss is substantially higher than the pure value of the marginal
contribution rate suggests. This intuition is conrmed by the numbers reported in
the eciency column of Table 3. While those generations who are already retired
hardly experience any eciency changes, excess burdens are strongly reduced for
generations which are close to retirement. Of course this reects the removal of the
earnings test at retirement. For younger generations the ecency gains are lower,
but they increase again for generations which enter the work force after privatiza-
tion. The latter, of course, reects the fall of the consumption tax rate during the
transition.
Consider now the implications for dierent income classes. While the qualitative
pattern is quite similar for all income classes, the quantitative dierences require
some additional comments. First, note that the intergenerational redistribution due
to changes in tax burdens is stronger for lower income quintiles than for higher in-
come quintiles. Tax burdens increase for poor elderly much more strongly than for
rich elderly. In the long-run, on the other hand, they are reduced for poor house-
holds much more strongly than for rich households. Two reasons are responsible for
this nding. On the one side, the contribution rate under the PAYG system was
regressive due to the contribution ceiling. On the other hand, due to the progressive
wage tax, rich households consume relatively more leisure than poor households.
The increase in the consumption tax rate is, therefore, regressive while the long-run
reduction in the consumption tax rate favors poor households more. The factor
price column shows another quantitative dierence between income classes: rich
households benet signicantly more strongly from the long-run increase in wages.
The reason is that the exogenously specied age-earnings prole is not only higher,
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but also steeper for rich households in comparison to poor households. Summing
up the income eects across generations we note that poor and rich households gain
at the expense of middle-income households. Not only income eects, but also the
eciency eects dier quantitatively across income classes. The fth column shows
that eciency eects are relatively low for poor and rich households, but relatively
high for middle income households. Since the marginal labor income tax for poor
households is zero or quite low, the distortion from the pension contribution rate is
also low. Rich households, on the other hand, face a zero contribution rate during
most of their working life. Consequently, some generations might even experience a
loss in eciency after privatization.
The right part of Table 4 reports the welfare consequences of a phased-out PAYG
system. Compared to the immediate elimination of the previous experiment, there
are mainly three dierences: rst, tax burdens now increase less for the elderly, but
more for middle-aged generations. Second, since the short and medium-run capital
accumulation is slower, phasing-out the PAYG system also dampens the intergen-
erational redistribution due to changes in pre-tax prices. Finally, the eciency
gains from privatization are reduced now quite signicantly. This clearly demon-
strates the trade-o the policy maker has to face: phasing-out pensions dampens
the intergenerational redistribution, but also reduces eciency substantially. The
intragenerational disaggregation reveals some interesting dierences across income
classes. Consider a thirty-year old household at the time of the pension reform. On
aggregate, his tax burdens increase compared to the previous experiment since con-
tributions have to be paid earlier than consumption taxes. However, if he belongs
to the middle income quintile, then his tax burden falls just slightly. The eciency
column reveals that this household's labor supply is aected quite strongly by the
nancing of the pension reform. If he still has to pay contributions for pensions,
then his labor supply is much lower than in the rst experiment and consequently
the labor income tax burden is lower. Thirty-year old households in the top income
quintile, on the other hand, face a zero marginal tax burden from contributions.
They even increase their labor supply compared to the consumption tax nancing
case and consequently their labor income tax burden increases strongly. Finally, the
labor supply of a thirty-year old who belongs to the lowest income quintile is hardly
aected. His tax burden increases slightly, since his tax payments are earlier in life.
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Similar considerations can be made for all other age groups in the dierent income
quintiles.
Table 5 reports the welfare and eciency consequences of the last three experiments
which are intended to test the sensitivity of the phase-out scenario. Since in each
simulation only one assumption is changed compared to the base case, the reported
gures have to be compared with the respective numbers in the right part of Table
4.
If the pension reform is preannounced, consumption taxes have to increase while
the capital stock falls during the preimplimentation phase. As shown in Table 5,
this mainly has two implications: First, the ecency gains from privatization are
considerably reduced for generations living in the initial years after the policy an-
nouncement. This is, of course, due to the intertemporal substitution in labor supply
towards future periods. Second, initial elderly generations are hit by the increase
in tax burdens and by the immediate fall of capital prices. On the other hand, the
time lag is benecial to generations around age 50, since they fully experience the
higher wages as well as the removal of the earnings test. Policy preannouncement,
therefore, reduces the overall eciency gains and favours initially living middle-aged
generations at the expense of already retired and initially living younger generations.
While policy preannouncement will aect the welfare eects of households living in
the initial years of the transition, it will not reduce the enormous welfare gains of
generations living in the long run. In order to dampen this intergenerational redis-
tribution, advocates of the reform recommend an increase in the decit in order to
shift part of the burden of privatization towards future generations. The middle part
of Table 5 shows that such a policy works in principle, but it can also have some
unintended side eects. Compare rst the aggregate eects without (lower right
part of Table 4) and with (lower middle part of Table 5) debt nancing. A perma-
nent decit increase diminishes the intergenerational income redistribution via both
channels: the long-run rise in the consumption tax increases the tax burdens for
young and future generations. In addition, the decreased capital accumulation dur-
ing the transition signicantly reduces the redistribution due to changes in pre-tax
prices. The eciency column also shows that some middle-aged generations experi-
ence eciency gains compared to the base run, while future generations experience
eciency losses. This is, of course, due to the fact that the service of the increased
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Table 5: Welfare eects of pension privatization: sensitivity of phase-out
a
time lag debt policy Smopec
Birth year U EB U EB U EB
Lowest Quintile
-70 -0.33 0.00 0.45 -0.02 0.27 0.03
-50 -0.19 0.64 -0.87 0.67 -1.03 0.85
-30 -0.78 0.20 -0.61 0.29 -0.75 0.21
-20 -0.43 0.22 -0.06 0.19 -0.09 0.07
0 2.02 0.25 1.94 0.23 2.53 0.26
Innity 7.78 0.42 3.94 0.30 5.28 0.41
Third Quintile
-70 -0.32 0.00 0.40 -0.01 0.30 0.03
-50 0.32 0.58 -0.04 0.72 -0.16 0.72
-30 -0.32 0.07 -0.07 0.23 -0.24 0.21
-20 -0.10 0.11 0.34 0.24 0.25 0.24
0 1.97 0.54 2.00 0.54 2.53 0.75
Innity 6.61 1.10 3.60 0.73 4.91 1.15
Top Quintile
-70 -0.26 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.26 0.03
-50 0.44 0.50 -0.02 0.47 -0.18 0.72
-30 -0.29 0.33 0.03 0.13 -0.21 0.48
-20 -0.11 0.24 0.44 0.29 0.26 0.29
0 1.87 0.55 2.06 0.48 2.75 0.79
Innity 6.10 1.25 3.51 0.69 5.03 1.31
Aggregate
-70 -0.29 0.00 0.36 -0.01 0.28 0.03
-50 0.29 0.55 -0.16 0.62 -0.30 0.75
-30 -0.37 0.18 -0.11 0.22 -0.32 0.31
-20 -0.16 0.20 0.32 0.27 0.20 0.24
0 1.94 0.51 2.02 0.49 2.55 0.70
Innity 6.35 1.09 3.65 0.69 5.02 1.13
a
Changes expressed as percent of the present value of remaining lifetime resources.
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debt has to be nanced by distortionary consumption taxes. The intragenerational
disaggregation reveals that especially rich households experience eciency losses.
Of course, this is again due to the income ceiling which implies a zero marginal
contribution rate for households in the top income quintile. In addition, due to
the regressivity of the consumption tax in the present model, debt nancing also
undermines intragenerational equity.
Finally, I consider the phase-out scenario in a small open economy. Redistributive
eects due to changes in gross-of-tax prices are now zero in the long run. Since
capital inows increase the corporate tax revenue, the consumption tax rate even
falls in the short-run and labor supply is distorted less. The last column of Table 5
therefore reveals higher generational specic eciency gains. For most poor income
households, however, excess burdens are slightly higher due to the higher consump-
tion tax rate during the transition. The lower excess burdens for households of the
middle and top income quintile might be due to the constant long-run wages which
imply a lower marginal wage tax rate. Since tax burdens fall and asset prices in-
crease in the short-run, especially the initial elderly are better-o in a small open
economy compared to the closed economy.
4. Conclusions
The aim of the present paper was to compare some realistic policy scenarios for
privatization of the German pension system. Therefore the policy reforms examined
in the paper only compensated the accrued pension claims from the old system
which are observable for the government. Although the number of the alternative
nancing schemes studied by the paper are quite limited, the obtained results still
allow to draw some broad policy conclusions.
First, the privatization of the PAYG public pension system is a means of enhancing
the ecency of the overall tax and transfer system. As reported in Table 3, even
in the worst case scenario the annual ecency gains amount to DM 25 billion.
This gure can more than double if an alternative nancing scheme is used and
the reform is implemented without a considerable time lag. The main reason for
these eciency gains is the long run switch from the payroll tax base to the less
distortive consumption tax base. Additional eciency gains also result from the
elimination of labor supply distortions around the retirement age. Of course, these
gures represent an argument in favor of privatization.
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Second, a clear warning also seems to be in place: there is no free lunch from pri-
vatization. Given the highly progressive tax system and the highly complex public
pension system of Germany, one can hardly expect a Pareto-improving privatization
scenario. As a consequence, some households will experience welfare losses from pri-
vatization. The present paper demonstrates the double trade-o faced by the policy
maker: maximizing the eciency gains from privatization takes place at the cost
of dramatic intra- and intergenerational redistribution. Reducing these distributive
eects of privatization by means of labor taxation, policy preannouncement or debt
nancing will also dampen the eciency gains from privatization.
Third, the simulation model highlights the regressivity of consumption taxation al-
though it applies a lifetime incidence approach. This might be surprising on rst
sight, since in a life cycle setup, lifetime consumption is usually proportional to life-
time income. Consequently, a number of recent lifetime incidence studies contradict
the regressivity result of traditional annual incidence studies, see the overview in
Chernick and Reschovsky (1996). However, in the presence of a highly progressive
labor income tax, rich households consume relatively more leisure than poor house-
holds. For this reason, poor households have to bear a higher burden than rich
households when consumption taxes are increased.
Finally, the simulation results also indicate that distribution analysis based on an-
nual income may be highly misleading. While the Gini-coecients of Table 3 which
are computed with annual income clearly show a deterioration in the income dis-
tribution, a comparison of the long run welfare consequences of dierent lifetime
income classes gives the opposite result. Households in the lowest lifetime income
quintile gain considerably more than households in the middle and top income quin-
tile.
Of course, although the simulation model incorporates many complex details from
reality, it also abstracts - as does any model - in important ways from reality. The
quantitative numerical results, therefore, have to be interpreted cautiously. Espe-
cially the stable demographic structure and the perfect capital market of the present
model seem to undermine the usefullnes of the quantitative ndings. A more re-
alistic demographic structure has to represent the aging of the current population
and the long run decrease in the labor force. In principle, such population dynamics
are relatively straightforward to incorporate in the AK model using time dependent
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population growth rates. The benchmark situation then is not represented by a
steady state path but by a transition path which reects the currently projected in-
crease in the contribution rates. Alternative privatization schemes are then applied
to dampen or to eliminate the future increase in contribution rates. It is very much
likely that such a setup will yield much higher long run eciency gains from priva-
tization, since the the present model puts the existing PAYGO pension system in a
rather favourable light. Various authors have also incorporated liquidity constraints
into the overlapping generations framework. In the presence of liquidity constrained
households, it makes a dierence whether people are forced by the government into
private saving accounts or whether they contribute voluntarily. The simulations
of Cifuentes and Valdes-Prieto (1997) indicate that liquidity constraints can have
a strong impact on the macroeconomic adjustment and the welfare consequences
after privatization. In future work, I therefore plan to extend the model in these
directions.
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